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ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM AS FORUM SHOPPING
CALE JAFFE*
INTRODUCTION
Public policy advocates of all stripes—litigators, politicians, or news-
paper columnists—invoke principles of federalism when they are implor-
ing Congress to respect limits imposed by Article I, and when they are
insisting that a state legislature accede to the supremacy of a duly enacted
national law, invoking Article VI. Yet historically, application of the term,
“federalism,” at least in the context of environmental law, has been driven
far more by pragmatic considerations than constitutional ones.1
This pragmatic approach should not be surprising because, at its
core, federalism simply asks what is the right level of government to solve
a given problem. After an environmental problem has been discovered—a
fish kill or noxious smell emanating from a nearby river, for example—our
thoughts immediately turn to how this problem can be solved. Figuring
out how we get to “clean,” then requires us to consider who will be in
charge of making decisions throughout the clean-up process. Who decides
which actors are responsible for contamination from a toxic waste landfill
that has leached into that nearby river? Who decides who pays for the
clean-up? Who decides when the clean-up is complete?
This critical question—who decides—is central to debates on en-
vironmental federalism. In the example of toxic waste spilled into a river,
federalism doctrines will consider the roles of the local government that
zoned for the landfill, the state government that issued a permit for the
landfill, and the federal government that established regulations affect-
ing toxic waste management from cradle to grave.
* Associate Professor of Law, General Faculty, and Director of the Environmental and
Regulatory Law Clinic, University of Virginia School of Law.  The author wishes to thank
Michael Livermore for his feedback, and the participants in the 2018 Colloquium on
Environmental Scholarship at Vermont Law School, where an early draft of this Article
was presented. Gratitude is also owed to the participants in the February 2020 sym-
posium on climate change hosted by the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review.
1 See generally, e.g., Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regula-
tion, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005).
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The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to document how debates
over environmental federalism have indeed been driven far more by prag-
matic factors (like forum shopping by litigants) than by constitutional con-
siderations (like concern for the limits of Congress’s enumerated powers).
Part I briefly pays its respects to the historical, constitutional underpin-
nings of federalism. Parts II, III, and IV then give an overview of environ-
mental federalism in practice, focusing on federal land management in the
Western United States (Part II), the history of air pollution regulation (Part
III), and the current debate over climate policy (Part IV). Building off of the
study of these experiences, Part V then culminates with an analysis of
federalism as forum shopping—i.e., driven by the pragmatic concerns of
stakeholders as opposed to any commitment to a particular constitutional
philosophy or states’ rights.
I. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF FEDERALISM
The federalist structure of the U.S. Constitution has long been un-
derstood as a compromise at the time of the founding between those who
favored a stronger central government and those who preferred a looser
confederation where states would remain preeminent.2 Of course, the
Constitution itself is a relatively sparse document,3 which provides only
limited insight into the thinking of the founders as they sought to strike a
balance between central power and state autonomy. One source that courts
and scholars have relied on for additional insights is the Federalist Papers,
a collection of documents authored (anonymously) by Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and John Jay to advocate for the newly created constitu-
tion.4 Their contemporaneous arguments about the Constitution, address-
ing both its strengths and vulnerabilities, remain a useful jumping-off
point for any analysis of the doctrine of federalism. Three basic observa-
tions have often been drawn from the Federalist Papers to assist lawyers
and laypeople alike in understanding the U.S. Constitution:
• First, the retention of independent state sovereignty.As articulated in Federalist No. 32: “[T]he state
2 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1514–15 (1987).
3 See A Look at the Sizes of State Constitutions, TEX. POL. PROJECT, https://texaspolitics
.utexas.edu/educational-resources/look-sizes-state-constitutions [https://perma.cc/2Q88
-4SM5] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
4 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupo, The Most-Cited Federalist Papers, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 403
(1998); Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the
Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801 (2007).
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governments would clearly retain all the rights of
sovereignty which they before had, and which were
not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United
States.”5
• Second, the supremacy of the National government
whenever a conflict between Federal and State au-
thority arises. Again, Federalist No. 32 explains that
“alienation[] of state sovereignty” would occur, for
example, where the Constitution “granted an au-
thority to the Union, to which a similar authority in
the States would be absolutely and totally contra-
dictory and repugnant.”6
• Third, the essential value of maintaining both sov-
ereigns, state and national, in constant and healthy
tension with each other. As famously stated by
James Madison in Federalist No. 51,
Ambition must be made to counter-
act ambition. . . . In the compound
republic of America, the power sur-
rendered by the people is first divided
between two distinct governments
[national and state], and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided
among distinct and separate depart-
ments [executive, legislative, judi-
cial]. Hence a double security arises
to the rights of the people. The dif-
ferent governments will control each
other; at the same time that each
will be controlled by itself.7
Criticisms of modern environmental law have long referenced the
rise of the 20th century administrative state as a development that could
not have been foreseen or intended by the founding generation.8 Fodder
for this argument is easy to assemble; James Madison’s insistence that
5 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
6 Id. (emphasis added).
7 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
8 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1232–33 (1994); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,
98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 331–35 (1999).
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“[t]he number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United
States will be much smaller than the number employed under the particu-
lar States”9 appears in superficial tension with the creation of the U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and other federal agencies engaged in environmental
policymaking. Opponents of federal action might reference the sheer size
of federal agencies to supplement an argument that the national govern-
ment has overstepped its constitutionally prescribed authority.
Supporters of federal action will counter that federal authority has
evolved over two and a half centuries to respond to the needs of a grow-
ing nation. To state the obvious, the original text of the Constitution did
not acknowledge voting rights for non-property-owning men, much less
voting rights for any woman.10 It allowed the horror of slavery to remain
in force, while barring “Indians not taxed” from inclusion in the census
and counting African Americans as “three fifths of all other Persons.”11
The expansion of federal agencies following the enactment of modern
environmental laws in the early 1970s is a relatively modest evolution of
our governmental structure when compared to the seismic changes that led
to amending the Constitution—either by war, amendment, or practice—
to address the tragic injustices from the founding era. The expansion of
federal agencies has been made vitally necessary to carry out the purposes
of the founding document in a dramatically more complex world.
Relatedly, it is impossible to predict the founding generation’s view
of modern environmental law given that environmental advocacy, as prac-
ticed today, did not even exist in the 18th and early 19th century. As Jon
Cannon phrased it, the Constitution was drafted in a “pre-ecological” era.12
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Company gives some insight into that
earlier world-view.13 The Supreme Court was called upon to consider the
impact of a dam that had been constructed on a tributary of the Delaware
9 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also Steven Mintz, Winning the Vote: A History of Voting
Rights, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. AM. HIST. (2004), https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-now
/essays/winning-vote-history-voting-rights [https://perma.cc/QK67-VSZZ]; Grace Panetta
& Olivia Reaney, Today is National Voter Registration Day. The evolution of American
voting rights in 242 years shows how far we’ve come—and how far we still have to go, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/when-women-got-the-right-to
-vote-american-voting-rights-timeline-2018-10 [https://perma.cc/F9Q7-BSUP].
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
12 JON CANNON, ENVIRONMENT IN THE BALANCE: THE GREEN MOVEMENT AND THE SUPREME
COURT 29 (2015) (explaining the “Constitutional Setting” for environmental law).
13 Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829).
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River.14 Yet there were no modern aquatic scientists to aid the Court in
its analysis and document the value of wetlands for wildlife habitation
preservation, flood mitigation, and maintenance of clean, healthy water.15
The environmental harms caused by the dam were never evaluated. In-
stead, the Court highlighted the dam’s “positive” attributes: “[t]he value of
the property on its banks must be enhanced by excluding the water from
the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably improved.”16
So yes, respecting the historical roots of federalism is undeniably
necessary as we try to make sense of environmental federalism today, but
we need to be wary not to deify the founding generation. For our commu-
nities to address the diverse spectrum of environmental problems that we
are facing, we must embrace a more active understanding of the Consti-
tution.17 Figuring out who decides how to resolve a controversy (again,
the question that undergirds environmental federalism) is fundamentally
a pragmatic task.
II. THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION, THE REAGAN REVOLUTION, AND
THE WESTERN EXPERIENCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM
Understanding the pragmatic challenges with any federal response
to environmental concerns requires appreciating the long history of
conflict between state and federal authorities in this policy arena. As far
back as the late 19th century, Westerners had documented their frustra-
tions with federal involvement in public lands management. Civil War
veteran-turned-explorer, John Wesley Powell, surveyed much of the West
and reported in 1893 at an International Irrigation Congress meeting in
Los Angeles, “I tell you gentlemen, . . . you are piling up a heritage of
conflict and litigation over water rights for there is not sufficient water
to supply the land.”18
14 Id. at 245.
15 See Brief for Aquatic Scientists and Scientific Societies as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, No. 18-260 (July 19, 2019); see also,
e.g., Thomas E. Dahl & Gregory J. Allord, History of Wetlands in the Conterminous United
States, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/history.html
[https://perma.cc/KYG5-KKBP] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020) (explaining that wetland con-
servation largely emerged in the 1960s, over a century after Willson).
16 Willson, 27 U.S. at 251.
17 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005).
18 WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY POWELL AND
THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST 342–43 (Penguin Books 1992) (1954).
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In the first half of the 20th century, the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers embarked on plans to construct a series of dams for flood control
along the Brazos River in North Central Texas, not far from the city of
Fort Worth.19 The naturalist John Graves lamented the pending arrival
of those dams in Goodbye to a River, first published in 1959.20 Graves
captured the skepticism that many Westerners would bring to meetings
with federal land managers. Opponents of the dams, Graves wrote, were
“bottom-land farmers and ranchers whose holdings would be inundated,
competitive utility companies shrilling ‘Socialism!’ and big irrigationists
downstream” who would lose access to water.21 Their concerns about dam
management were insufficient to impede the call for government-managed
flood control. “When someone official dreams up a dam, it generally goes
in. . . . Maybe you save a Dinosaur Monument from time to time, but in-
between such salvations you lose ten Brazoes.”22 The kind of deep-seated
disrespect documented by Graves—of “someone official” telling Westerners
how to care for “their” land—can be seen in a myriad of instances. In each
case, the evidence suggests a frustration by at least some stakeholders
over how the “who decides” question has been answered.
The writer Rick Bass documented a telling anecdote from a wildlife
biologist working on reintroduction of the endangered Mexican wolf in
rural Arizona in the mid-1990s. The scientist was awoken at gunpoint
while sleeping in his pickup truck.23 His assailant wrongly assumed that
the truck’s Washington State license plates were from Washington, D.C.,
and that he “had caught a spy, an infidel from that foreign land, napping
within his territory.”24
The ante was upped in 2014, when Cliven Bundy famously engaged
in an armed and unlawful stand-off with agents from the Bureau of Land
Management (“BLM”) while refusing to pay grazing fees for use of federal
land.25 The stand-off ended with BLM returning the cattle and pledging to
continue efforts to recoup grazing fees “administratively and judicially.”26
19 Brazos River Authority, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N (June 12, 2010), https://tshaonline.org
/handbook/online/articles/mwb01 [https://perma.cc/86HN-BN3C].
20 See JOHN GRAVES, GOODBYE TO A RIVER (Vintage Books 2002) (1959).
21 Id. at 9.
22 Id.
23 RICK BASS, THE NEW WOLVES 83–84 (1998).
24 Id. at 84.
25 RICHARD L. REVESZ ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1221–22 (4th ed. 2019).
26 Andrew Prokop, The 2014 controversy over Nevada rancher Cliven Bundy, explained,
VOX, https://www.vox.com/2014/8/14/18080508/nevada-rancher-cliven-bundy-explained
[https://perma.cc/C66F-CD2P] (last updated May 14, 2015) (citing a press statement from
the BLM dated April 12, 2014).
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Bundy’s extralegal resistance was the model for twenty-five armed mili-
tants who seized control of federal property in the Malheur National Wild-
life Refuge in Oregon for six weeks in 2016.27 Indeed, Cliven Bundy’s son,
Ammon, was one of the primary organizers of the Malheur occupation.28
The Bundy family and those who cheered the Malheur siege were
not writing on a blank slate. Their insistence that local, private actors
should decide how federal, public lands are administered built on the so-
called “Sagebrush Rebellion”—a movement rooted in states’ rights ideo-
logy.29 The Sagebrush Rebellion began with passage of the 1976 Federal
Land Policy and Management Act, which “reversed the long-held pre-
sumption that most of the public domain would eventually be disposed
of,” and that federal holdings in Western states no longer would be sold to
private actors.30 Nevada responded to the new congressional policy with
a 1979 act declaring that the “State of Nevada has a strong moral claim
upon the public land retained by the Federal Government within Nevada’s
borders,” and that the “exercise of such dominion and control of the public
lands within the State of Nevada by the United States works a severe,
continuous and debilitating hardship upon the people of the State of
Nevada.”31 Several other western states soon adopted similar measures.32
In 1982, then-Governor of Arizona Bruce Babbitt (who would later
go on to serve as Secretary of the Interior under Bill Clinton33), cautioned
that it would be “easy to dismiss the motives of the small group of stock-
men and their political allies who have revived the rallying cry of states’
rights for their own benefit,” but that the well of support for Sagebrush
rebels evinces “a deep-seated frustration” with federal land management
practices.34
That frustration, however, was not anchored in respect for fed-
eralism as constitutional theory. Rather, it was pragmatic. For ranchers
27 Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Property Clause and Its Discontents: Lessons
from the Malheur Occupation, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 781, 793–94 (2017).
28 Sam Levin, Oregon militia standoff: one dead after Ammon Bundy and others arrested,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/26/oregon-mi
litia-standoff-ammon-bundy-arrested-and-one-confirmed-dead-after-shootout [https://perma
.cc/79TE-UKBK].
29 Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of
the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 853 (1982).
30 Id. at 852–54.
31 NEV. REV. STAT. § 321.596 (1970).
32 Babbitt, supra note 29, at 848.
33 See List of Past Secretaries, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/whoweare/past
-secretaries [https://perma.cc/HE45-FRA4] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
34 Babbitt, supra note 29, at 847, 852–53.
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who had worked on BLM land for decades, a states’ rights argument was
simply and honestly the tool that best suited their advocacy needs in the
moment. Then-candidate Ronald Reagan capitalized on that sentiment
during the 1980 presidential campaign and famously declared, “[c]ount
me in as a rebel,” trumpeting his own, avowed commitment to states’
rights.35 Yet as discussed in Part V below, President Reagan did not ad-
here to a theory of states’ rights constitutionalism once in office.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE: A HISTORY OF AIR
POLLUTION REGULATORY EFFORTS
The story of industrialized air pollution provides a clear example
of how the ground has shifted over many decades, and how litigants have
engaged in forum shopping as the shift has progressed.36 Today, many
stakeholders view air pollution from stationary sources as an interstate
issue, best regulated at the federal level.37 Air pollution, after all, does
not respect state boundaries, and it is difficult for one state to address an
air pollution problem that is caused by industrial contaminants blowing
in from a neighboring state’s power plants.38 While national regulation
of power plants under the modern Clean Air Act is now accepted as a base-
line environmental safeguard, this was not always the case. Throughout
the first half of the 20th century, industrial air pollution was perceived
as an issue of public health and welfare, which meant that it rested ex-
clusively within the purview of the several states’ police powers.39
35 Howell Raines, ‘Sagebrush Rebellion’ Gets Reagan’s Strong Support, DISPATCH, July 7,
1980, at 5, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1734&dat=19800707&id=_JcbAAAAI
BAJ&sjid=x1EEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4226,632733 [https://perma.cc/3Y6T-TATU].
36 An excellent history of air pollution control law in the United States, from the founding
until the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, can be found in Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Cen-
tury of Air Pollution Control Law: What’s Worked; What’s Failed; What Might Work, 21
ENVTL. L. 1549 (1991).
37 Today, under the federal Clean Air Act and state air pollution control laws, industrial
facilities like factories and power plants are referred to as “stationary sources” of air
pollution, which are subject to different environmental, public health, and safety regu-
latory regimes than “mobile sources,” e.g., cars, trucks, and off-road vehicles. See generally,
e.g., David P. Currie, Direct Federal Regulation of Stationary Sources Under the Clean Air
Act, 128 PENN. L. REV. 1389 (1980); Stationary Sources of Air Pollution, EPA, https://www
.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution [https://perma.cc/3TMT-JLKN] (last updated
Oct. 8, 2019).
38 See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 515 F.3d 344, 347 (4th
Cir. 2008).
39 The police powers are commonly thought of as those powers delegated to the states under
the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and including laws and regulations to
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The instinct for early 20th century American policymakers was
to protect air quality through use of local or intra-state options—although
even those efforts were resisted as impediments to industrial progress.40
In fact, the first attempts at government regulation of air pollution were
through city ordinances. In 1881, the City of Chicago adopted what is con-
sidered to be the nation’s first air pollution control measure—an ordinance
that declared “dense smoke . . . from any chimney anywhere within the
city” to be a public nuisance.41 The ordinance was enforceable by the city’s
Commissioner of Health and the Superintendent of Police, who were di-
rected “to make complaint against and cause to be prosecuted all persons
violating” the ordinance.42 A report from the Department of Health for
the City of Chicago documented the success of the ordinance in its first two
years of implementation: “all doubt as to the feasibility and legality of the
ordinance have been dispelled, and business men generally are beginning
to appreciate and approve the necessity of the ordinance.”43
Although the Clean Air Act of 1970 is sometimes credited as origi-
nating the concept of technology-forcing environmental regulations, the
Chicago ordinance proved to be something of a precursor.44 The issuance
“secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its citizens . . . .” Po-
lice Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
40 Reitze, Jr., supra note 36, at 1576–79.
41 EGBERT JAMIESON & FRANCIS ADAMS, THE MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO: COMPRISING
THE LAWS OF ILLINOIS RELATING TO THE CITY OF CHICAGO AND THE ORDINANCES OF THE
CITY COUNCIL: CODIFIED AND REVISED 386 (Beach, Barnard & Co., Legal Printers 1881).
Prior to the formal adoption of ordinances like the one in Chicago, environmental regu-
lation was affected through application of common law tort doctrines. James V. Fitzpatrick
& Austin N. Heller, A Dynamic Air Resource Management Program, City of Chicago, 15
J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 297, 297–301 (1965), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi
/pdf/10.1080/00022470.1965.10468381 [https://perma.cc/A37N-5L26].
42 JAMIESON & ADAMS, supra note 41, at 386.
43 REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, CITY OF CHICAGO, FOR THE YEARS 1881 AND
1882, at 136–37 (Geo. K. Hazlitt & Co., Printers 1883) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE DE-
PARTMENT OF HEALTH] (providing the “Smoke Inspector’s Report from July, 1882 to
December 31, 1884”).
44 See, e.g., Hon. Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1748–49 (1991) (“Continuing a trend that began with the original Clean
Air Amendments of 1970 (1970 Amendments), and has grown with amendments to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act (Superfund) and the Resources
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the 1990 Amendments include numerous pro-
visions that force the development of new technologies to provide for health protection
and to achieve environmental objectives. The rationale behind technology forcing is that
by setting emissions standards that are beyond the reach of conventional control methods,
Congress creates a market incentive that can force the development and commercializa-
tion of new technologies. In the 1970 Amendments, the approach succeeded in spurring
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of notices of violation and prosecutions against violators of the ordinance
compelled businesses and entrepreneurs to engineer solutions to control
pollution. Thus, the city’s Smoke Inspector reported:
Great progress has been made within the last two years by
the improvements of smoke-preventing devices and the in-
vention of new ones; nowhere in the United States have
they attained such a state of perfection in so short a time as
in the City of Chicago. I have personally examined within
two years over sixty different devices, but only six of them
have proved successful and each of the six now in success-
ful operation differ in merits generally, but all abate the
smoke nuisance.45
Similar ordinances were adopted in other municipalities across
the country. The City of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance in the early
1900s that made it “unlawful for any person to establish or operate a brick-
yard . . . or place for the manufacture or burning of brick within de-
scribed limits in the city.”46 The ordinance was driven by the expansion
of the city’s population, which grew sixfold between 1890 and 1910, with
residential communities pushing out into industrial areas.47 Joseph
Hadacheck, who had purchased an eight-acre parcel outside of the city
boundaries of Los Angeles for the purpose of excavating clay and manu-
facturing it into bricks, challenged the ordinance on federal constitutional
grounds, “charg[ing] a deprivation of property, the taking of property with-
out compensation [in violation of the 5th Amendment], and that the
ordinance is in consequence invalid.”48 The Los Angeles prohibition was
upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States with explicit reference
to the state’s police power.49 A win for “State’s rights,” in this context, was
a win for the “pro-environment” citizens of Los Angeles, who had sought to
mitigate harms from urban air pollution by turning to the municipal pow-
ers that derived their authority from the State of California.50
development of the catalytic converter for control of automotive tailpipe emissions.”)
(internal citations omitted).
45 REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, supra note 43, at 138.
46 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404 (1915).
47 Kathy A. Kolnick, Order Before Zoning: Land Use Regulation in Los Angeles, 1880–1915,
at 198 (May 2008) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Univ. of S. Cal.), http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm
/ref/collection/p15799coll127/id/61051 [https://perma.cc/A5D9-6S5E].
48 See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 407.
49 Id. at 410.
50 See generally MANUELA ALBUQUERQUE, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS NAVIGATING THE CALIFORNIA
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Similarly, the seminal case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co. upheld the authority of local governments to adopt ordinances for
“the creation and maintenance of residential districts, from which busi-
ness and trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment houses, are
excluded.”51 Coming eleven years after Hadacheck, the Euclid Court
seemed to accept without controversy the fact that the authority to im-
pose zoning restrictions, if it existed at all, rested with the states. Thus,
the Court explained, “[t]he ordinance now under review, and all similar
laws and regulations, must find their justification in some aspect of the po-
lice power, asserted for the public welfare.”52 The takeaway from the
Chicago ordinance, the Los Angeles litigation, and Euclid is clear; envi-
ronmental advocates (even if they did not use that label to identify
themselves) relied on state and local decision-makers to resolve the
controversies they cared about.
A generation after Euclid, however, clean air advocates started to
anticipate a stronger federal hand, effectively abandoning their early 20th
century preference for a states’ rights approach. One of the more instruc-
tive events to spur a reconsideration of environmental policy was the
occurrence of a catastrophic event known as the Donora Death Fog. The
town of Donora, Pennsylvania, on the banks of the Monongahela River,
was a steel-making town in the 1940s.53 The U.S. Steel Corporation owned
and operated the Donora Zinc Works, which along with other steel-
related industries in the area, employed most of the adult residents in
Donora.54 In 1948, more than twenty years before the birth of the federal
Clean Air Act of 1970, the Donora Zinc Works operated without any
CONSTITUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF CITIES (Feb. 8, 2013), https://www.law.berk
eley.edu/files/Albuquerque1_-_Constitutional_Powers_of_Cities-MLI_Feb_8_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ESG-EP39]; Sean Hecht, “States’ Rights” and Environmental Law: Cali-
fornia on the Front Lines, LEGAL PLANET (Mar. 6, 2017), https://legal-planet.org/2017/03/06
/states-rights-and-environmental-law-california-on-the-front-lines/ [https://perma.cc/JV
S2-WWDU].
51 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
52 Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
53 See Steel Mill, DONORA HIST. SOC’Y & SMOG MUSEUM, https://www.sites.google.com/site
/donorahistoricalsociety/steel-mill [https://perma.cc/HQ4Q-TWGR] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
54 Edwin Kiester, Jr., A Darkness in Donora, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Nov. 1999), https://www
.smithsonianmag.com/history/a-darkness-in-donora-174128118/ [https://perma.cc/CW2W
-7UDN]; see also Reitze, Jr., supra note 36, at 1585; Elizabeth Guenther, Donora Death
Fog: The Crisis that Led to Modern Air Pollution Laws, AM. INST. CHEMICAL ENGINEERS
(Oct. 27, 2011), https://www.aiche.org/chenected/2011/10/donora-death-fog-crisis-led-mod
ern-air-pollution-laws [https://perma.cc/A8ML-WDL9]; Ann Murray, Smog Deaths In 1948
Led To Clean Air Laws, NPR (Apr. 22, 2009), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story
.php?storyId=103359330 [https://perma.cc/4M9U-YHFX].
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notable environmental constraints.55 Sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon
monoxide, and fine particulate matter fanned out from Donora’s unregu-
lated smokestacks.56
When an anticyclone stalled over Pennsylvania on October 26,
1948, it held air pollution from the Donora Zinc Works smokestacks close
to the ground. The thick fog of contaminants was immediately apparent.
Simply walking to work on the morning of October 27th, residents suf-
fered eye, nose, and throat irritations.57 Over the next five days—through
Halloween of 1948—the smog worsened. That week’s high school football
game was “almost invisible,” with teams electing to run the ball since no
one could track a pass through the smog.58 A restaurant owner later re-
called turning his ankle when stepping off of the curb “because I couldn’t
see my feet.”59 Community leaders asked the zinc plant operators to shut
down the facility until the pollution abated, but the owners of the plant
refused.60 The local Donora Hotel had to be converted to a makeshift hos-
pital as the pre-existing medical resources were overwhelmed.61 By the
end of the week, as many as 14,000 people were sickened.62 Twenty-two
were confirmed dead.63
Press coverage in national magazines led the federal Public Health
Service to begin an investigation.64 The federal response ultimately led
to enactment of the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955—the country’s first
federal air pollution statute.65 The Donora Historical Society and Smog Mu-
seum claims that “Clean Air Started Here” in Pennsylvania.66
55 Lorraine Boissoneault, The Deadly Donora Smog of 1948 Spurred Environmental
Protection—But Have We Forgotten the Lesson?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 26, 2018), https://
www.smithsonianmag.com/history/deadly-donora-smog-1948-spurred-environmental-pro
tection-have-we-forgotten-lesson-180970533/ [https://perma.cc/B3QR-CGLN].
56 Elizabeth T. Jacobs et al., The Donora Smog Revisited: 70 Years After the Event That
Inspired the Clean Air Act, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S85, S86 (2018).
57 Murray, supra note 54.
58 Kiester, Jr., supra note 54.
59 Id.
60 Murray, supra note 54.
61 Id.
62 Teresa Bonner, ‘People realized smog could kill’: Legacy of 4 deadly days in Donora, Pa.,
PENNLIVE (May 22, 2019), https://www.pennlive.com/news/2017/04/deadly_smog_in_pa
_town_paves_w.html [https://perma.cc/5K2Z-3KNJ].
63 Id.
64 Kiester, Jr., supra note 54.
65 Evolution of the Clean Air Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolu
tion-clean-air-act [https://perma.cc/RH6C-7PNT] (last updated Jan. 3, 2017).
66 1948 Smog, DONORA HIST. SOC’Y & SMOG MUSEUM, https://www.sites.google.com/site/dono
rahistoricalsociety/1948-smog [https://perma.cc/3YXG-7V2Z] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
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These early federal environmental laws—including the 1955 Air
Pollution Control Act—still expected states to shoulder most of the burden
through exercise of their historic police powers.67 The 1955 law, entitled “An
Act to provide research and technical assistance relating to air pollution
control,” simply allocated money for federal research into air pollution
and made financial assistance available to states that might be eager to
take the lead on the issue.68 It did not, however, include the technology-
forcing federal requirements that are a hallmark of the modern Clean Air
Act.69 As the federal Bureau of the Budget (the precursor to today’s Office
of Management and Budget, “OMB”) reported in 1955, “unlike water pol-
lution [affecting navigable rivers that cross state boundaries], air pollution
is essentially a local problem.”70
The law was significantly amended in 1963, but still affirmed that
“municipal, State, and interstate action to abate air pollution shall be
encouraged and shall not be displaced by Federal enforcement action ex-
cept as otherwise provided” in Section 5 of the 1963 Act, which detailed
a tightly circumscribed, federal enforcement option that was only available
to address cross-state air pollution concerns.71 That enforcement option
required at least a full year of regulatory process and public hearings be-
fore any litigation to remedy an air quality violation could be initiated.72
67 Reitze, Jr., supra note 36, at 1580–81.
68 Air Pollution Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322, 322 (1955).
69 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 111,
84 Stat. 1676, 1683–84 (1970).
70 Reitze, Jr., supra note 36, at 1585 (quoting the Bureau of the Budget).
71 Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 5(b), 77 Stat. 392, 396 (1963) (amended 1970).
72 The process under the 1963 Clean Air Act would work as follows: [1] Where air pollution
generated in one state was endangering populations in a downwind state, the U.S. Sec-
retary of Health, Education, and Welfare was authorized to convene a conference and
“invite the cooperation of any municipal, State, or interstate air pollution control agencies”
to participate. Id. § 5(c)(1)(C). [2] After the conclusion of the conference, if the Secretary
determined that “effective progress toward abatement of such pollution [was] not being
made,” the federal government would then issue “recommendations” on “necessary remedial
action” and “allow at least six months” for the involved states to implement those recom-
mendations. Id. § 5(d). [3] If, following that initial six-month period, the air pollution
problem had not been resolved, the Secretary could then hold a public hearing before a
“board of five or more persons,” which had to include at least one member selected by the
state causing the air pollution problem and one member selected by the state suffering
from the air pollution problem. Id. § 5(e)(1). Further, the majority of hearing board members
needed to be individuals who were not “officers or employees of the [U.S.] Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare.” Id. [4] The Secretary was then authorized to send the
board’s recommendations to the individuals or businesses causing the air pollution
problem and provide them at least an additional six months to abate the pollution. Id.
§ 5(e)(3). [5] After the end of this second six-month period, if the problem still remained
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It is critical to emphasize how reluctant policymakers were in this
era to leverage federal power to address the nation’s air pollution crisis.
The cautious approach of the 1963 Clean Air Act was highlighted by Sidney
Edelman, then the Chief of the Environmental Health Branch within the
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Edelman’s views, as
a federal civil servant in that era, offer a window into how regulators might
have typically viewed their authority.
Quoting United States v. Darby,73 Edelman wrote in 1965,
The regulation and control of air pollution has long been
held to be clearly within the scope of the police power of
the states, but, “[i]t is no objection to the assertion of the
power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is
attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise
of the police power of the states.”74
Thus, Edelman assured readers that the 1963 Act and its Section 5 en-
forcement authority “does not evidence a congressional intent to exceed
its constitutional authority by regulating matters of strictly internal
concern to the state. Rather, the section must be taken as reflecting con-
gressional determination that any air pollution of such magnitude as to
endanger the health or welfare of persons in the state in which it originates
is likely to, and indeed, does affect interstate commerce.”75 Edelman contin-
ued, “[a]ny discharge of pollution into the air anywhere is a discharge
into navigable [by aircraft] airspace, but the [1963] Clean Air Act does
not purport to reach all intrastate air pollution. It extends to such pollu-
tion only when its effects are significant . . . .”76
Not surprisingly, the byzantine process mandated by the federal
statute only yielded one significant case decision—United States v. Bishop
Processing Co.—and that case was not resolved until 1970, the same year
that the modern Clean Air Act was enacted as a wholesale replacement
to the 1963 law.77 Nevertheless, Bishop Processing provides insight into
unresolved, the Secretary was finally authorized to “request the Attorney General to
bring a suit on behalf of the United States to secure abatement of pollution.” Id. § 5(f)(1).
73 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
74 Sidney Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the Commerce Power
to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1082 (1965).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1086–87.
77 See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1676 (1970); United
States v. Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1970); Reitze, Jr., supra note 36,
at 1587.
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how litigants can leverage federalism to suit their legal arguments. That
is, the political winds on federalism shifted in Bishop Processing based
on the short-term objectives of the parties.
The residents of Selbyville, Delaware had complained for years
about the poor environmental practices at the Bishop Processing Com-
pany’s chicken plant across the state border in Bishop, Maryland.78 Yet
it was not until 1965, at least six years into multistate efforts to address
the problem, that “the United States Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare received a request from the Delaware authorities” asking it to
intervene pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the 1963 Clean Air
Act.79 A directive from federal authorities to “abate the pollution not later
than December 1, 1967” proved “fruitless,” which led to an enforcement
action, filed in district court in March 1968, which sought to “enjoin Bishop
from discharging malodorous air pollutants.”80 The United States District
Court for Maryland ultimately ruled in favor of the Delaware complain-
ants.81 On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Bishop Processing’s objections
echoed “states’ rights” concerns hostile to federal enforcement:
It is contended that information supplied by employees of
the United States should not have been considered, for the
federal government is an adversary in this proceeding. It is
argued to us that appellant had faith in the Delaware Di-
rector [of the state’s Air Pollution Control Division] but not
in the federal officials and that appellant’s expectation [from
an earlier consent decree] was that the Delaware official
would not rely upon federal representations made to him.82
Importantly, the position of Bishop Processing Co. on questions of
federalism—who decides what is clean—is reversed from the position that
the industrial polluter took in Hadacheck v. Sebastian. In Hadacheck, when
the lever of authority was a local ordinance, the brick kiln operator pleaded
for federal intervention to strike down the ordinance.83 In Bishop Process-
ing, when the lever of authority was a federal intervention, the chicken
78 Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d at 470 (observing that litigation sought “to induce
Bishop Processing Company . . . to abate the malodorous air pollution which allegedly
moves across the state line to pollute the air of nearby Selbyville”).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 471.
81 Id. at 472.
82 Id. at 472–73.
83 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 407–09 (1915).
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processing plant sought deference to state officials to manage the clean-
up.84 The industrial party’s position on federalism was not inherently
“pro”- or “anti”-federal action.
A few years later, when President Nixon signed the 1970 Clean
Air Act Amendments into law, the federal approach to air quality regula-
tion at issue in Bishop Processing would not be so circumspect. The 1970
Amendments replaced the laborious process under Section 5 of the 1963
statute, which was highly deferential to the states, with a model that
relied on a much stronger federal hand that would come to be labeled
“cooperative federalism.”85 Under Section 109 of the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments, the federal government sets nationally applicable air quality
standards (the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, or “NAAQS”),
which are established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for
multiple pollutants (sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide,
ozone, lead, and particulate matter).86 Under Section 110, each state is
obligated to develop a State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) to ensure that it
is able to maintain or attain the NAAQS for each of these pollutants in
every city and county within its borders. States that fail to develop a
plan—or propose an insufficiently stringent plan—face the prospect of
the EPA imposing its own Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”).
The adoption of a federal hammer like the FIP process in the 1970
Act—something Congress neglected to impose in 1955 after a nationally
resonant crisis like the Donora Death Fog—raises an important conun-
drum: what changed with respect to perspectives on federalism and states’
rights between 1955 and 1970? The seminal civil rights cases from that
era might help answer that question. Indeed, as Jon Cannon has observed:
Claiming parallels between their movement and the civil
rights movement, environmentalists sought constitutional-
level recognition of environmental rights comparable to
the Court’s decision barring racial segregation in schools
in Brown v. Board of Education.87
In Heart of Atlanta v. United States, the Court considered applica-
tion of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which had been recently
adopted by Congress and signed into law by President Lyndon Baines
Johnson, to a “whites only” motel in Atlanta, Georgia that objected to any
84 See Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d at 473.
85 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604 § 5, 84 Stat. 1676, 1689–90 (1970).
86 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1679.
87 CANNON, supra note 12, at 28.
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requirement “to rent available rooms to Negroes against its will . . . .”88 The
law was enacted pursuant to article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the Con-
stitution, which provides Congress with authority to “regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”89 The racist owners of the Georgia motel insisted that their op-
eration was local, intra-state commerce and outside of the reach of federal
regulators. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that
the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also
includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof,
including local activities in both the States of origin and
destination, which might have a substantial and harmful
effect upon that commerce. . . . Congress may—as it has—
prohibit racial discrimination by motels serving travelers,
however “local” their operations may appear.90
Katzenbach v. McClung was argued with and decided on the same
day as Heart of Atlanta.91 The case considered the business practices of
Ollie McClung, Sr., and his son, who owned and operated Ollie’s Barbeque
in Birmingham, Alabama.92 The McClung men entertained white resi-
dents at their sit-down restaurant, but refused to accept African-Ameri-
can customers inside.93 Instead, non-white customers were served via “a
take-out service for Negroes.”94 The McClung’s chief argument was that
unlike a motel business that courted out-of-state travelers, their segrega-
tionist operation was chiefly an intra-state commercial affair.95 The
Court noted that “the volume of food purchased by Ollie’s Barbecue from
sources supplied from out of state was insignificant,” but nevertheless
upheld the application of Congress’s law to the business, quoting the
Court’s 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn.96 A “trivial” contribution to in-
terstate commerce, the Court explained, would not exempt Ollie’s Barbeque
“from the scope of federal regulation.”97
88 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 244 (1964).
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
90 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258.
91 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 294 (1964).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 297.
94 Id. at 296.
95 Id. at 298.
96 Id. at 300–01.
97 Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 301 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942)).
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Katzenbach and Heart of Atlanta mark an important evolution in
our understanding of federalism, because they further extended the role
for Congress to commercial areas that had traditionally been the exclusive
subject of the states’ police powers. Once the Supreme Court accepted
federal involvement in the management of motels, restaurants, and public
schools, it became easier for Congress to follow suit and contemplate a
federal solution for other pervasive problems like industrial air pollution.
In this way, champions of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments owe a debt
of gratitude to the civil rights activists of the 1960s.
IV. THE PENDULUM SWINGS AGAIN: FEDERALISM AND STATE
APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE
In a moment that is analogous to the first air pollution ordinances
of the 1880s, the country is now seeing the re-emergence of state leadership
on the most dominant environmental concern of our time: global warming.
In the late 19th century, without any prospect for remedial action by the
federal government, municipalities like Chicago took the lead and adopted
technology-forcing laws to curb coal-fired air pollution.98 A similar story
is now playing out to address carbon pollution. Delivering on a campaign
promise, President Trump initiated efforts in June of 2017 to withdraw
the United States from the Paris Agreement to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).99 The Commonwealth
of Virginia is one of several states that responded by taking matters into
its own hands. In 2020, the Virginia General Assembly passed the Virginia
Clean Economy Act, which seeks to place electric utilities on a mandatory
path to a zero-carbon electricity grid.100
Indeed, appeals to federalism have been seen both in President
Trump’s deregulatory effort on climate change as well as the responses
to it. The Koch-funded advocacy organization, Americans for Prosperity,
pilloried the Obama administration’s signature program to address climate
change, the Clean Power Plan, as an “overreach of executive power” that
would have “force[d] states to slash their carbon emissions and switch to
costlier forms of energy.”101 Building on this narrative, the Attorney
98 See William G. Christy, History of the Air Pollution Control Association, 10 J. AIR POL-
LUTION CONTROL ASS’N 126, 129–30 (1960).
99 Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (June 1,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris
-climate-accord/ [https://perma.cc/4CC3-R782].
100 SB 851, 2020 Sess. (Va. 2020).
101 AFB Praises Clean Power Plan Repeal, AMS. FOR PROSPERITY (Oct. 9, 2017), https://ameri
cansforprosperity.org/afp-praises-clean-power-plan-repeal/ [https://perma.cc/T769-FC5L].
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General of Texas sought an administrative stay of the Clean Power Plan
under the allegation that the rule “represents a significant expansion of
EPA’s power without a legitimate legal basis.”102 The Obama-era regu-
lation, according to the Texas Attorney General’s request, called “for a
sweeping reorganization of States’ energy infrastructure” and “displace[d]
sovereign powers that Congress has reserved for the States.”103
When the Trump administration announced its proposal to re-
place the Clean Power Plan with the “Affordable Clean Energy Rule,” an
analysis by the Natural Resources Defense Council104 argued that the
Trump proposal was “all about propping up dirty coal-fired power plants”
and amounted to nothing more than a “Dirty Power Scam . . . [that] cooks
the books to justify increasing harmful air pollution.”105 Conservation-
minded organizations opposed to the repeal insisted that EPA was
abdicating its obligation to provide federal leadership on reducing green-
house gas pollution. The National Trust for Historic Preservation, relying
on statutory commands in the Clean Air Act, commented, “EPA cannot
lawfully repeal the [Clean Power Plan] and leave a vacuum with no [fed-
eral] regulation of GHG emissions from stationary sources.”106 The National
Trust further emphasized that “given the severe threats that climate
change poses, it would be arbitrary and capricious for EPA to weaken vital
GHG regulations by moving from the 2015 Clean Power Plan to the less-
protective Proposed ACE Rule.”107
102 Letter from Ken Paxton, Att’y Gen. of Tex., to Gina McCarthy, EPA Administrator, re:
EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602; Application for an Administrative Stay of the
Final Rule on Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:




104 Starla Yeh, How EPA Admin. Wheeler Cooks the Books for Dirty Power Scam, NAT.
RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/starla-yeh/how
-epa-admin-wheeler-cooks-books-dirty-power-scam [https://perma.cc/CK3R-D8YC].
105 Id. (emphasis omitted).
106 Letter from Cale Jaffe, Univ. of Va. Envt’l & Regulatory Law Clinic, and Sharee
Williamson, Nat’l Tr. for Historic Preservation in the U.S., to Peter Tsirigotis, U.S. EPA,
re: Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355: Proposed Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generation Units (Apr. 26,
2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-19923 [https://
perma.cc/W5Q7-EF52].
107 Letter from Cale Jaffe, Univ. of Va. Envt’l & Regulatory Law Clinic, and Sharee
Williamson, Nat’l Tr. for Historic Preservation in the U.S., to Nicholas Swanson, U.S. EPA,
re: Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355—Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions for Existing Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing
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As the Trump deregulatory juggernaut rolls forward, left-leaning
legislatures and governors are flexing their muscles and affirming state-
specific commitments to the UNFCCC goals. In the face of federal
intransigence, state and local governments have stepped into the
regulatory vacuum. As of 2019, there were two major nonfederal GHG
programs designed to implement multistate cap-and-trade regimes. The
first is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), which covers
GHG emissions from the electricity sector in ten states: Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.108 Each of these state sovereigns
has adopted its own state-level statutes and regulations to join the RGGI
regime.109 The second program is based in California and was established
by the California Global Warming Solutions Act, also known as Califor-
nia Assembly Bill 32.110 The California program covers not only emissions
generated by the energy sector, but also large industrial facilities and
transportation providers.111 As stated above, the Commonwealth of
Virginia has developed its own state-level carbon reduction regulation
that is designed to link into the multistate RGGI program.112
A report funded by Michael Bloomberg lists seventeen states and
540 cities, counties, and tribal governments that have signed non-binding
pledges to help meet the United States’ obligations under the Paris Agree-
ment through nonfederal means.113 According to the study’s authors, these
jurisdictions “represent over half of the U.S. population (173 million peo-
ple), over half of the American economy ($11.4 trillion), and over 35 percent
Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.reg
ulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-24006 [https://perma.cc/2BAL-WGGY].
108 Welcome, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/ [https://perma
.cc/2W2Y-HF9M] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
109 State Statutes & Regulations, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www
.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/state-regulations [https://perma.cc/V9YM-YMHU]
(last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
110 Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab
32/ab32.htm [https://perma.cc/69UU-AR3N] (last updated Aug. 5, 2014).
111 CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA’S 2017 CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN: THE STRATEGY
FOR ACHIEVING CALIFORNIA’S 2030 GREENHOUSE GAS TARGET ES6–ES11 (Nov. 2017), https://
ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8CK-VVU2].
112 SB 851, 2020 Sess. (Va. 2020); Greenhouse Gases, VA. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, https://
www.deq.virginia.gov/Programs/Air/GreenhouseGasPlan.aspx [https://perma.cc/HJT6
-MYS9] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
113 BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES, FULFILLING AMERICA’S PLEDGE: HOW STATES, CITIES,
AND BUSINESSES ARE LEADING THE UNITED STATES TO A LOW-CARBON FUTURE 14 (2018),
https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/28/2018/09/Fulfilling-Americas-Pledge-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XK6F-UMNR].
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of nationwide GHG emissions.”114 Tellingly, the Bloomberg report cites Jus-
tice Brandeis’s famous dissent coining the term “laboratories of democ-
racy” to suggest that state experimentation on climate and energy policy
might even lead to better climate solutions that previously envisioned:
States control many of the most powerful energy and cli-
mate policy levers, such as renewable portfolio standards
and air pollution regulations. States will often experiment
and emulate peers: early mover states typically demonstrate
successful models and then engage others to follow. U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously called
states the “laboratories of democracy” thanks to their ability
to innovate and experiment with diverse policy solutions.
This is as true of energy and climate today as it was true
of leading public policy issues in Brandeis’s time nearly 80
years ago.115
The results of the Bloomberg study are buttressed by the findings
of Professor Sharmila Murthy, who has observed that “in the absence of
national leadership, subnational state and local actors have tried to fill
the void.”116
Mike Bloomberg, as an individual, nevertheless has made it clear
he would prefer federal controls. In a joint op-ed with then–California
Governor Jerry Brown, he wrote, “What happens in Washington still
matters, of course, and we need to vote out of office those who refuse to
recognize reality. But the American people are not waiting on Washington
to take action . . . .”117
But giving state-led initiatives the leeway to innovate on climate
policy might not simply be an alternative to federal action; it might very
well prove to be a necessary predicate to federal action. The Special Report
on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C, published by the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change in October 2018, documents the narrow
114 Id.
115 Id. at 34.
116 Sharmila L. Murthy, States and Cities as “Norm Sustainers”: A Role for Subnational
Actors in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 37 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 50 (2019).
117 Jerry Brown & Michael Bloomberg, Op-Ed: Even without the Trump administration, the
U.S. is upholding its commitment to the Paris climate agreement, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-brown-bloomberg-climate-summit-20180912
-story.html [https://perma.cc/3ELV-UEZL].
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and challenging pathways for industrialized nations to limit global warm-
ing to 1.5 or 2°C above pre-industrial levels.118 The report concludes,
“[t]here is no documented historic precedent” for the scale and speed of
economic transformation that needs to occur.119
State leadership is likely to prove invaluable in providing, if not
a historic precedent, then a realizable plan of action. Indeed, relying on
state leadership to reimagine the American economy is hardly a new
idea. The historian James Oakes has described how anti-slavery activists
envisioned a “cordon of freedom” as one state after another abolished the
unimaginably horrific and tragic institution of slavery, leaving the
remaining slave-owning republics more and more isolated.120 The “larger
goal was to surround the slave states . . . until, ‘like a scorpion sur-
rounded by fire,’ . . . slavery would sting itself to death—one state at a
time.”121 Oakes observed a key aspect about the role of state leadership
in the abolition movement. He writes:
We say all the time that in the late eighteenth century
slavery was abolished in “the North.” But that isn’t quite
right. . . . The North did not abolish slavery; rather, state
by state abolition created a section we call the North.122
Indeed, state action changed views on what was possible for a whole
region, which eventually led to change at the national level. There is a
lesson here in trying to predict how climate activism and carbon-neutral
states might remake the country today.123 Other scholars, notably Maxine
Burkett, have already drawn similar connections between “the slave and
fossil fuel economies.”124 As the Bloomberg report documents, many state
118 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL
WARMING OF 1.5°C (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site
/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3AP
-6X2N] (an IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels).
119 Id. at 15.
120 James Oakes, Making Freedom National: Salmon P. Chase and the Abolition of Slavery,
13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 407, 416–17 (2015).
121 Id. at 418.
122 Id. at 411.
123 See Maxine Burkett, Climate Disobedience, 27 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 20 (2016);
Karl S. Coplan, Fossil Fuel Abolition: Legal and Social Issues, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
223, 298–301 (2016); Albert C. Lin, Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
1135, 1169 n.170 (citing to a “number of commentators [who] have drawn this analogy”).
124 Burkett, supra note 123, at 20.
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governments are moving forward with concrete, binding statutes and
regulations to achieve carbon neutrality. Once these leadership states
succeed in establishing a proverbial “proof of concept” on a zero-carbon
economy, it will exert pressure on neighboring states throughout a given
region to follow.125 Professor Murthy has envisioned a similar role for
subnational actors writing, “[A]s norm sustainers, states and cities help
to demonstrate the feasibility of climate actions in a way that lays the
groundwork for national policy.”126
Pressure will come, in part, from the sheer economic force of some
state actors; California is the world’s fifth largest economy, and has set
a statewide target of achieving carbon neutrality by 2045.127 Pressure
will also be exerted by the interconnected nature of the electric transmis-
sion grid in many parts of the country. Virginia, for example, is part of
PJM Interconnection, a regional transmission organization that manages
wholesale electric power purchases throughout a region that covers all
or part of thirteen states and the District of Columbia.128 Virginia’s gover-
nor signed an executive order directing state agencies to outline the process
for achieving a “carbon-free” grid by 2050.129 The state’s public utility
commission, the Virginia State Corporation Commission, has ordered the
investor-owned utility Appalachian Power to develop integrated resource
plans for achieving “30% renewable power by 2030,” “75% renewable
power by 2040,” and “100% renewable power by 2050.”130
Implementing these plans undoubtedly will have some impact on
the wholesale market for fossil-fuel electricity within the PJM region. It
might begin to form a “cordon” of fossil-fuel-free states, as one state’s re-
fusal to purchase electricity from gas, oil, or coal-fired power plants changes
how Americans, region by region, think of their relationship to fossil fuels.
125 David Iaconangelo & Carlos Anchondo, ‘Remarkable leap.’ Va. backs 100% carbon-free
electricity, E&E NEWS (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/106255
4521/search?keyword=Virginia+Clean+Economy+Act [https://perma.cc/X7JF-UNMW].
126 Murthy, supra note 116, at 51.
127 David Roberts, California just adopted its boldest energy target yet: 100% clean elec-
tricity, VOX, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/8/31/17799094/california
-100-percent-clean-energy-target-brown-de-leon [https://perma.cc/4MT2-SEVZ] (last up-
dated Sept. 10, 2018).
128 See Territory Served, PJM, https://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/territory
-served.aspx [https://perma.cc/W5NK-PPXB] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
129 Va. Off. of the Governor, Exec. Order No. 43 (2019) at 3, https://www.governor.virginia
.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/executive-actions/EO-43-Expanding-Access-to-Clean-Energy
-and-Growing-the-Clean-Energy-Jobs-of-the-Future.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZZK-EQ 47].
130 COMMONWEALTH OF VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N, Final Order on App. Power Co.’s Inte-
grated Resource Plan filing pursuant to Va. Code § 56-597 et seq. 5 (Jan. 28, 2020), http://
www.scc.virginia.gov/docketsearch/DOCS/4kx901!.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RW2-MFUE].
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V. ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM AS FORUM SHOPPING
The conventional wisdom on federalism frames the discussion as
one that is deeply polarized. Those on the political left are assumed to pre-
fer a strong federal hand in environmental governance, while those on the
right are assumed to herald decentralized approaches. These assump-
tions allow for easy (albeit unhelpful) caricatures. Environmentalists are
demonized for favoring “job-killing” federal regulations; business lobby-
ists are pilloried for putting “profits ahead of people.”
One challenge to the federal Endangered Species Act highlights
just how this dynamic has played out. The challenge was launched by the
self-titled “People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners,” an
obvious dig at the prominent, animal rights organization, People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals, better known as PETA.131 PETPO, the
anti-PETA antagonist, explained that it was:
[F]ormed by residents of southwestern Utah who have
suffered for decades under federal regulations to protect
the Utah prairie dog. Its more than 200 members have
been prevented from building homes, starting small busi-
nesses, and in the case of the local government, from pro-
tecting recreational facilities, a municipal airport, and the
local cemetery from the Utah prairie dog’s maleffects.132
The nonprofit organization Friends of Animals intervened on the
side of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to push back against PETPO’s
premise:
[W]hat is really on display here is a difference of opinion
over the value of America’s natural heritage. On one side,
PETPO tends to view members of the animal kingdom to
be valueless unless they can be reduced to mere “commodi-
ties,” if the animal cannot be sold or traded, then it is no
more than a mere pest to be eradicated to make way for
human development. On the other side, there [are] . . . the
131 Prairie dogs and property owners: Both need protection from massive federal overreach,
PAC. LEGAL FOUND., https://pacificlegal.org/case/people-for-the-ethical-treatment-of-prop
erty-owners-v-fish-and-wildlife-service/ [https://perma.cc/XB72-TV6R] (last visited Apr. 2,
2020).
132 See Appellee’s Brief, People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., No. 2:13-cv-00278-DB, 2015 WL 2395758 (10th Cir. May 18, 2015).
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Federal Defendants, thousands of scientists, and millions
of Americans who recognize that protection of all members
of the North American biota—from the smallest fungi to
the greatest of mammals—is essential to biodiversity and
to human economic health.133
Federal leadership was assumed by Friends of Animals as essen-
tial to protecting broad public interests that were facing an acute threat
from development pressures.134 Devolution to the states, in the view of
PETPO, was a means of dodging “overly burdensome regulations.”135
Yet in other cases, regulated industries are happy with a federal
response if it serves a preferred policy outcome, and environmental groups
are ready advocates of “states’ rights” when they perceive a presidential
administration to be hostile to environmental protection.
The mining industry’s challenge to a Virginia statute that imposed
a moratorium on uranium mining is perfectly illustrative of this principle.
In Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, a mining company unsuccessfully
sought to overturn Virginia’s uranium ban as pre-empted by the federal
Atomic Energy Act, which gives the Nuclear Regulatory Commission au-
thority over the processing of nuclear fuel, but leaves states in charge of
the conventional mining of uranium ore.136 In the parlance of the Atomic
Energy Act, federal authority over uranium material does not begin until
“after removal from its place of deposit in nature.”137 Traditional conser-
vative and pro-business interests argued in favor of an expansive view
of federal power under this language from the Atomic Energy Act. Mean-
while, traditional liberal and pro-environmental groups argued in favor
of deference to state sovereignty.
133 Friends of Animals’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, People for
the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 2:13-cv-00278-
DB, 2014 WL 12649026 (D. Utah Feb. 18, 2014) (emphasis in original) (The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ultimately upheld the Fish & Wildlife Service’s regulation
and found that protection of the Utah Prairie Dog, a “purely intrastate species,” was law-
ful under the Endangered Species Act and a “constitutional exercise of congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause.”); see People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop.
Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 1008 (10th Cir. 2017).
134 AVINASH KAR ET AL., NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
AND GOVERNANCE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 1,
6 (Dec. 2010), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/int_10051901a.pdf [https://perma.cc
/DVR5-NNN2].
135 People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners, 852 F.3d at 996.
136 See Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1902 (Gorsuch, J., plurality opinion).
137 42 U.S.C. § 2092 (1992).
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Over the course of their political careers, U.S. Senators Tom
Cotton,138 Jim Inhofe,139 and Ted Cruz140 have each highlighted the Tenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in advocating for a limited view of
federal government power and deference to states’ rights. Yet each of
these Senators signed on to an amicus brief141 in support of a remarkably
sweeping view of federal regulatory power and deference to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission’s role. Their brief argued that the preemptive
scope of the Atomic Energy Act was not limited just to striking down
conflicting language in a state statute, but should also allow for a search-
ing review of a state’s legislative motive, even when that motive was not
memorialized in the text of the law.142 This broad view of preemption was
needed “for good reason,” they argued.143 “Federal preemption could be
rendered meaningless if state or local authorities could circumvent
federal policy through artful wording or other creative backchannels.”144
Positions taken by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce show a similar
flexibility with regard to federalism. In 2016, the Chamber published a
report that criticized a series of U.S. EPA actions as “federal efforts to
take control of state environmental programs.”145 Yet the U.S. Chamber
found itself in favor of a strong federal hand in Virginia Uranium v.
Warren, where the Chamber argued that states “in most instances still
138 See Press Release, Tom Cotton: Arkansas Senator, Boozman, Cotton Introduce Bill
Giving States Power to Reject Federal Electric Transmission Projects (Feb. 12, 2015),
https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=132 [https://perma.cc/BQ4C-JHN7].
139 See S.1632—Restoring the 10th Amendment Act, 113th Congress (2013), https://www
.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1632/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/94ZR-CU
9V] (James Inhofe signing on as co-sponsor on Oct. 31, 2013).
140 Alexandra Jaffe, Cruz introduces bill defending states’ rights on marriage, CNN
(Feb. 11, 2015), https://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/11/politics/ted-cruz-2016-gay-marriage
-bill/ [https://perma.cc/AXB7-D82X]; see also CNN: Cruz introduces bill defending states’
rights on marriage, U.S. SENATOR FOR TEXAS: TED CRUZ, https://www.cruz.senate.gov
/?p=news &id=2241=2241 [https://perma.cc/LY5X-FGXZ] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
141 See Brief for Senator Tom Cotton, Senator Jim Inhofe, and Senator Ted Cruz as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894
(2019) (No. 16-1275) (July 26, 2018).
142 See id. at 13–14.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 13.
145 WILLIAM L. KOVACS ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE GROWING BURDEN OF
UNFUNDED EPA MANDATES ON THE STATES 2 (Aug. 2016), https://www.uschamber.com
/sites/default/files/documents/files/022879_etra_epa_coercive_federalism_report_fin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4NEZ-J9V7] (statement of William L. Kovacs, then–U.S. Chamber
Senior Vice President for Environment, Technology & Regulatory Affairs).
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do not have[]the extensive experience the federal government has ac-
quired” in managing nuclear safety.146
On the other side of the aisle, Virginia’s Democratic Attorney
General, Mark Herring, insisted that the Republican Senators’ “approach
to preemption would be deeply misguided,”147 and relied on language
from the conservative lion of the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, to sup-
port his defense of Virginia’s mining ban statute: “[D]etermining whether
state and federal rules conflict based on the subjective intentions of the
state legislature is an enterprise destined to produce ‘confusion worse
confounded.’”148 The Attorney General’s position was supported by three
local environmental groups.149 Statewide conservation organizations pro-
moted the effort as well.150
Controversies over offshore drilling for oil and natural gas provide
another useful example of environmental federalism as forum shopping.
As discussed in Part II above, former California Governor Ronald Reagan
ran for President on a states’ rights platform. Once elected, however,
President Reagan rallied supporters to defend the authority of the fed-
eral government to override “states’ rights” when it suited his administra-
tion’s needs. A case in point is his effort to open up the coast of California
to offshore drilling. In 1972, Congress had enacted the Coastal Zone
Management Act (“CZMA”), which established a multistep process through
which the U.S. Department of Commerce could authorize oil and gas dril-
ling by private companies in federal waters.151 The statute required federal
agencies to conduct any activities “directly affecting” a state’s coastal
areas “in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consis-
tent with approved state management programs.”152
146 Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 6, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (No.
16-1275) (July 26, 2018).
147 Brief for Respondents at 1, Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (No.
16-1275) (Aug. 27, 2018).
148 Id. at 1–2 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
559 U.S. 393, 404 (2010)).
149 Brief of the Roanoke River Basin Association, Dan River Basin Association, and Pied-
mont Environmental Council as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Va. Uranium,
Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (No. 16-1275) (Sept. 4, 2018).
150 Mary Rafferty, Local Advocates Celebrate Uranium Ban Win at Supreme Court, VA.
CONSERVATION NETWORK (July 19, 2019), http://www.vcnva.org/local-advocates-celebrate
-uranium-ban-win-at-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/XV8T-MXQM].
151 See Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, §§ 301–304, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1464 (1972).
152 Id. § 1456(c)(1).
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California residents carried the recent memory of a disastrous
accident off the coast of Santa Barbara. Just three years before the CZMA
was enacted, a blowout on an oil rig operated by Union Oil (later known
as Unocal) spilled approximately three million gallons of crude oil, “cre-
ating an oil slick 35 miles long along California’s coast and killing thou-
sands of birds, fish, and sea mammals.”153 Responding to the Santa Barbara
incident, state officials drafted a California Coastal Management Plan
that sought to protect the state from suffering a similar catastrophe in
the future.154
The Reagan administration sought to override California’s plan,
arguing that the national interest in developing a stable supply of domestic
oil reserves overrode state-specific concerns. Indeed, the administration
argued that “the Arab oil embargo of 1973 precipitated renewed congres-
sional action” and led to a series of amendments to the CZMA in 1978
that put a thumb on the scale in favor of federal control.155 In Secretary
of the Interior v. California, the Supreme Court sided with the Reagan
administration and held that the sale of federal leases to begin explora-
tion for possible offshore oil and gas development could override a state’s
concerns as expressed in its coastal zone management program—at least
at this preliminary stage of the process.156
The oil-and-gas industry (represented by the Western Oil & Gas
Association) had joined the Secretary of the Interior to defend the Cali-
fornia lease sales, arguing before the Supreme Court that under the
CZMA the “role . . . for governors [was] to make recommendations; [the]
role . . . for the Secretary of the Interior [was] to have final authority to
assess a balance between state and national interests.”157 The oil-and-gas
industry reversed course years later, however, when the Obama White
House adopted a different view of the same energy issue. Hornbeck Off-
shore Services L.L.C. v. Salazar considered the industry’s challenge to
the Obama administration’s decision to impose a moratorium on offshore
153 Christine Mai-Duc, The 1969 Santa Barbara Oil Spill That Changed Oil and Gas Ex-
ploration Forever, L.A. TIMES (May 20, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me
-ln-santa-barbara-oil-spill-1969-20150520-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/DTD3-CUG4].
154 CAL. COASTAL COMM’N, DESCRIPTION OF CALIFORNIA’S COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
(CCMP) 1–4.
155 See Brief for Petitioners at 55, Sec. of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) (No.
82-1326).
156 Sec. of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
157 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Sec. of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984)
(No. 82-1326).
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drilling in the Gulf of Mexico following the Deepwater Horizon disaster.158
An amicus brief filed on behalf of the Louisiana Oil and Gas Association
posited:
The oil and gas industry provided the stabilizing force
necessary to sustain the Louisiana economy in the after-
math of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and is vital to the
continued viability of the Gulf Coast as it grapples with
the continued effects of the recession and the oil spill. The
moratorium essentially cuts the legs from under Gulf Coast
communities which are struggling to survive.159
Contrary to the industry’s public policy view during the Reagan years,
drilling operators confronting the Obama administration insisted that
state and local impacts should pre-empt a Secretary of the Interior’s
preferred, national policy.
The legislative era of the 1970s is often recognized as marking the
birth of modern environmental law and, with it, the dominant role played
by federal actors. The Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Land Management, among other
regulators, would grow to assert primacy over a broad swath of environ-
mental concerns. The Reagan era sought to unwind at least some of the
federal regulatory apparatus, but a contemporaneous account of the ad-
ministration’s efforts documented mixed results. “Strangely enough, in
spite of its strong language, the Reagan administration did not actually
do very much,” wrote Susan Rose-Ackerman in 1990.160 She explained
that “limited attempts at reform were made at the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency,” but that these efforts largely failed as they were aimed
at blind deregulation that proved difficult to defend in the courts.161
“Simple inattention can reduce the pages in the Federal Register, but
genuine reform requires expertise and commitment.”162 Add to Rose-
Ackerman’s account the times—such as with the development of offshore
158 Hornbeck Offshore Services v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (2010).
159 Brief of Sen. Mary Landrieu of the State of Louisiana et al. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiff-Appellee’s Opposition to Defendants-Appellants’ Motion for Stay, at
7, Hornbeck Offshore Services v. Salazar, 713 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 10-30585).
160 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Defending the State: A Skeptical Look at ‘Regulatory Reform’
in the Eighties, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 517, 518 (1990).
161 Id. at 523.
162 Id. at 526.
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oil and gas resources—when the Reagan administration explicitly fa-
vored a strong federal hand, and Reagan’s record as a states’ rights
advocate becomes even murkier. His mixed record does not mean, how-
ever, that the core question of environmental law and federalism—who
decides—was permanently resolved in favor of national control.
In the parlance of litigators, advocates on all sides engage in
“forum shopping,” seeking the venue where a judge or jury is most likely
to return a favorable verdict.163 Forum shopping thus provides a subtle
gloss on the broader, political considerations and deliberative or techno-
cratic factors that undergird our description of environmental law and
federalism.164 The takeaway here is that federalism concerns are not as
neatly partisan as they are sometimes portrayed. Answers to the ques-
tion of “who decides” evolve over time. What the above examples dem-
onstrate—from land management to offshore oil exploration to uranium
mining—is that ideological commitments to “federalism” are remarkably
fluid from case to case, as environmental activists and industry represen-
tatives try to put their arguments before the local, state, regional, or fed-
eral decision-maker who is most likely to deliver a preferred outcome.
CONCLUSION
As the late Doug Kendall argued, honest, federalism-respecting
arguments should not reflexively be assigned to conservatives. Citing
state-government support for various progressive, federal legislative efforts,
Kendall argued, “If federalism is about protecting the States, why not
listen to them?”165 Indeed, why not listen to all stakeholders when at-
tempting to determine what level of government is best suited to resolve
any environmental concern? As the examples highlighted here demon-
strate-from public lands management in the West, to urban air pollution
regulation in the late 19th century, to the birth of the modern Clean Air
Act in 1970, to state-level leadership on global climate change today—
environmental federalism has always been driven by pragmatic concerns
from litigants and not by any commitment to a particular constitutional
philosophy. In disputes over uranium mines, Endangered Species Act
163 Forum Shopping, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
164 See Michael Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 638–39
(2017).
165 J.E. AUSTIN ET AL., REDEFINING FEDERALISM: LISTENING TO THE STATES IN SHAPING
“OUR FEDERALISM” 10 (2004).
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enforcement, and moratoria on offshore drilling, environmental activists,
industry executives, and other stakeholders have all shared a pragmatic
approach to answering the “who decides” questions of environmental law.
Perhaps acceptance of this commonality can help us dial down the rhetoric
and narrow the partisan divide that has made environmental policymaking
so polarizing in recent years.
